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Alle diese Kenntnisse lassen sich nicht durch den Apparat wissenschaftlicher Formeln und
Maschinerien erzwingen, sondern sie erwerben sich nur, wenn in der Betrachtung der Dinge
und im Leben ein treffendes Urteil, wenn ein nach dieser Auffassung hingerichtetes Talent
ta¨tig ist.1
(Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege)
Abstract
The paper investigates the qualification for the UEFA Champions League, the most
prestigious club competition in European football with respect to the theoretical
property of strategy-proofness. We find that in three seasons (2015-16, 2016-17,
2017-18), the UEFA Europa League titleholder might have been better off by losing
its match against the Champions League titleholder in their domestic championship.
A straightforward solution is suggested in order to avoid the occurrence of this
paradox. The use of an incentive compatible rule would have a real effect on the
qualification in these three seasons of the UEFA Champions League.
JEL classification number: C44, D71, Z20
MSC class: 62F07, 91B14
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1 “These are things the knowledge of which cannot be forced out by an apparatus of scientific formula
and machinery: they are only to be gained by the exercise of an accurate judgment in the observation
of things and of men, aided by a special talent for the apprehension of both.” (Source: Carl von
Clausewitz: On War, translated by Colonel James John Graham, London, N. Tru¨bner, 1873. http:
//clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm)
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1 Introduction
In an appropriately designed tournament, players are interested in eliciting costly effort
to win as many games as possible. However, sometimes a team might be punished for
showing a better performance (Kendall and Lenten, 2017).
This note, similarly to some recent works of the field (Dagaev and Sonin, 2018; Csato´,
2018a,b, 2019a), focuses on the particular case when a team is guaranteed to be better off
by losing a match, that is, the probabilistic aspect of manipulation (Pauly, 2014; Vong,
2017) is neglected. Specifically, we will show that UEFA Champions League (CL) entry
has been incentive incompatible in the three seasons between the years 2015 and 2018.
The problem is caused by the rule describing the qualification of the UEFA Europa
League (EL) titleholder (from the previous season) for the CL: “The UEFA Europa League
titleholder is guaranteed a place in the competition as a minimum in the play-offs. It will
have priority filling a vacancy created in the group stage or in the play-offs by the UEFA
Champions League titleholder” (see Article 3.04 of UEFA (2015), UEFA (2016), and UEFA
(2017) for the 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18 seasons, respectively). Consequently, since
a place in the group stage is preferred to a place in the play-offs, the EL titleholder is
interested in creating a vacancy in the group stage, which can be achieved in the domestic
championship if EL titleholder is from the same association as the CL titleholder.
Based on a theoretical finding of Dagaev and Sonin (2018), we suggest a slight modi-
fication in filling the potential vacancy to guarantee strategy-proofness. The use of an
incentive compatible rule would have a real effect on the qualification in these three seasons
of the Champions League.
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the situation to be described here has many
conditions and they have never been fulfilled. Even in this case, probably no team would
have been an incentive to lose intentionally a match because winning would have a higher
expected value. Furthermore, the controversial rule is not applied currently by the UEFA.
On the other hand, even an improbable scenario may cause problems in practice (for
instance, Csato´ (2019b) shows that the theoretical issue outlined in Dagaev and Sonin
(2018) has arisen in the 2011-12 season of the Dutch national soccer championship), and
punishing a team for its better performance seems to be a severe violation of fairness.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a real-world illustration
of the problem. Its background is discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 concludes.
2 A hypothetical example
The Premier League – the top English professional league for association football clubs,
played as a home-away round-robin tournament – ranks the teams lexicographically with
the number of points being the first criterion. A win is awarded by three points, and a
draw is awarded by one point.
On the basis of the results in the 2016-17 season, England has had four places in the
2017-18 UEFA Champions League allocated as follows (UEFA, 2017, Annex A):
∙ the winner, the runner-up, and the third-placed club qualify for the CL group
stage; and
∙ the fourth-placed club qualifies for the CL play-off.
Hence, if the CL titleholder is among the best three clubs, then the EL titleholder
qualifies for the group stage of the CL, as described in Section 1. Otherwise, it should play
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a play-off, and it advances to the CL group stage only by winning this particular play-off
over to legs against a team from another UEFA association.
Table 1: Final ranking of the 2016-17 Premier League season
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Chelsea 30 3 5 85 33 52 93
2 Tottenham Hotspur 26 8 4 86 26 60 86
3 Manchester City 23 9 6 80 39 41 78
4 Liverpool 22 10 6 78 42 36 76
5 Arsenal 23 6 9 77 44 33 75
6 Manchester United 18 15 5 54 29 25 69
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Lost; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points.
There are three types of teams. Some of them go to the Champions League group stage (in bold),
some of them go to the Champions League play-offs (italicized) and some of them do not qualify for
the Champions League (roman).
Table 1 shows the final league table for the top six teams at the end of the 2016-17
season. Consider the following scenario. Suppose that Manchester City have won the
2016-17 UEFA Champions League, and Manchester United have won the 2016-17 UEFA
Europa League.2 According to the entry rules, the CL titleholder Manchester City qualify
for the group stage of the CL through its domestic championship, which creates a vacancy
in the group stage, filled by the EL titleholder Manchester United.
Manchester United have lost by 1-2 at home against Manchester City on 10 September
2016. What would have happened if Manchester United would have defeated Manchester
City in this match? Then Manchester City would stand with 75 points, so Liverpool would
be the third at the end of the 2016-17 season and would qualify for the CL group stage.
Furthermore, Manchester City would qualify for the CL group stage as the titleholder,
however, Manchester United would qualify only for the CL play-offs, and should defeat an
opponent in order to qualify for the group stage (UEFA, 2017, Article 3.03).
To conclude, Manchester United would be strictly worse off (at least, with respect to
the CL qualification) if it would have defeated Manchester City.
It may seem at a first sight that this paradox is almost irrelevant since its occurrence
assumes full knowledge of the future. Nevertheless, we think it means a serious violation
of fairness because the misaligned UEFA rule punishes Manchester United for its better
results.
3 Discussion
The incentive incompatible allocation rule has been used in three CL seasons (2015-16,
2016-17, 2017-18). Then the scenario presented in Section 2 would have occurred when:
∙ the two (CL and EL) titleholders are from the same national association; and
∙ at least one team is directly qualified for the CL group stage from this national
association.
2 Actually, Manchester United have won the EL, but Manchester City have been eliminated in the
round of 16 of the CL.
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Hence, according to the access list of the 2017-18 CL season (UEFA, 2017, Annex A),
the problem concerns the twelve strongest associations: Spain, Germany, England, Italy,
Portugal, France, Russia, Ukraine, Belgium, Netherlands, Turkey, and Switzerland.3
In these years the CL titleholders were Barcelona, Real Madrid (both from Spain),
and Real Madrid, respectively, while the EL titleholders were Sevilla (from Spain), Sevilla,
and Manchester United, respectively. Despite the CL and EL titleholders were from the
same UEFA association in two seasons, there was no danger of manipulation since the CL
titleholders were safely among the top teams that directly qualify for the CL group stage.
A situation close to the one described in Section 2 has been modelled by Dagaev
and Sonin (2018) in general. Dagaev and Sonin (2018, Proposition 3) can be replicated
when the domestic championship is a round-robin tournament played in two rounds on a
home-away basis, while the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League are
considered as knock-out tournaments. This result practically says that the qualification is
strategy-proof if and only if all vacant slots are allocated on the basis of the round-robin
tournament, i.e., the domestic championship.
In our real-world problem, the teams compete for slots in two types of tournaments,
the group stage and the play-offs of the CL, where the former is more valuable. It means
that, similarly to Dagaev and Sonin (2018, Section titled “Extensions and Discussion”), a
general formal analysis would be cumbersome as the number of types of vacancies increases
dramatically (we have even two knock-out tournaments instead of one). Thus, instead of
analysing all possible allocation rules, we consider only the actual UEFA regulation, which
gives a priority for the EL titleholder to fill any vacancy in the CL group stage created by
the CL titleholder.
Then Dagaev and Sonin (2018, Proposition 3) implies that the vacant slot should
be allocated on the basis of the round-robin domestic championship in order to avoid a
possible punishment of the EL titleholder. We think it is the obvious mechanism that
guarantees incentive compatibility (at least with respect to the qualification of the EL
titleholder).
This strategy-proof version of the allocation rule – which fills the vacancy from the
domestic championship – would make a real difference in these three CL seasons:
∙ 2015-16: Valencia (the fourth team in Spain) would have qualified for the CL
group stage instead of Sevilla (EL titleholder), which would have played the CL
play-off against Monaco (from France);
∙ 2016-17: Villarreal (the fourth team in Spain) would have qualified for the CL
group stage instead of Sevilla (EL titleholder), which would have played the CL
play-off against Monaco;
∙ 2016-17: Liverpool (the fourth team in England) would have qualified for the CL
group stage instead of Manchester United (EL titleholder), which would have
played the CL play-off against 1899 Hoffenheim (from Germany).
Consequently, Villarreal would not have suffered a significant financial loss due to its
elimination from the CL group stage in the 2016-17 season.
Despite a situation susceptible to manipulation has not materialized, the potential
betting markets and match-fixing implications could be quite severe. Furthermore, it seems
3 The set of the top twelve strongest associations was the same in the 2016-17 season (UEFA, 2016,
Annex A), but Greece was among them instead of Switzerland in the 2015-16 season (UEFA, 2015,
Annex A).
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unfair to use an allocation rule that may punish a team for its better performance. Perhaps
UEFA administrators have recognized this danger: in the framework of a substantial
reform of the CL qualification, they have decided to guarantee a slot for the EL titleholder
in the CL group stage from the 2018-19 season (UEFA, 2018).
While it clearly eliminates the problem of bad incentives, the current mechanism forces
another team to play a play-off instead of the EL titleholder in order to qualify for the CL
group stage. Hence its superiority or inferiority compared to our suggestion depends on a
policy choice.
4 Conclusions
Regulations governing major sports are usually thought to be relatively stable. In fact,
some rule books are under constant development, for example, the UEFA Champions
League entry is revised in every three years. These changes sometimes have unforeseen
consequences as illustrated above.
We think that even the marginal probability of a sports ranking rule working imperfectly
is a sufficient reason for scientific researchers to write notes and papers such as the current
one in order to report these issues and suggest ways to circumvent them.
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